CityBeat: How do you see the Iran situation today?
Dr. Bennett Ramberg: Both Washington and Tehran appear to be playing "chicken." Much like two cars careening
toward each other, both are reluctant to step off the accelerator and avoid a disastrous collision. Washington's current
incentive package may do little to change the momentum, given Iran's repeated commitment to continue its enrichment
program.
Could that result in a global crisis?
You bet it could. Iran sits at the pivot of the world's oil resources. Were conflict to break out - were the United States to
conduct a military strike as Israel did in 1981 against Iraq to eliminate Tehran's suspect nuclear weapons capacity - the
world economy would be impacted dramatically. If you think $70 per barrel is a lot of money, think again; $100-$150 is
the trajectory of petroleum pricing that we could see as a base plateau. Then there is the possibility of Iranian retaliation
against U.S. interests in Iraq and elsewhere. That's why we have to figure out a diplomatic formula that would both test
Iran's intentions and mobilize the international community to oppose its nuclear weapons development. I think I have
found one in "nuclear probation."
Probation?
Yes. It is a unique means to resolve the conflict. It would grant Iran's right to mature its nuclear fuel-cycle facilities,
subject to the presence of residential inspectors and a "nuclear mousetrap" - an automatic international enforcement
mechanism endorsed by the Security Council that would spring into action were Iran to break a nonproliferation tripwire.
It's an idea based on accepting Iran's position that it only wants to develop nuclear capability for peaceful purposes, but if
it bolts from its nonproliferation vows the hammer would drop with predetermined sanctions culminating in military
consequences without any of the dilly-dallying we see now at the U.N.
That seems like a tall order. Is there a historical context that bears out the possibility that this could actually work?
This would be a novel approach that would reinforce international mechanisms to enforce nonproliferation generally. A
review of history suggests why it is needed. Iran's interest in nuclear weapons actually goes back to the era of the Shah.
In the 1970s, the United States provided Tehran with nuclear assistance as part of our Atoms for Peace program. We
believed that exports tethered to oversight would prevent countries from getting the bomb.
So there were safeguards?
Oh, yes. In 1970, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] went into force, requiring all signatories to reveal their
nuclear activities, except the five acknowledged nuclear weapons states - the U.S., the USSR, Britain, France, and China.
However, the Shah hoped to use the peaceful program to shroud a parallel nuclear weapons effort. The ambition went
up in smoke with the 1979 Iranian revolution that kicked him out of the country.
So the Shah falls and then what happened?
Well, the revolutionary regime revived the possibility through an enrichment program.
The enriched uranium could give them the bomb, right?
Well, it depends on the level of enrichment. Power reactors require uranium-35 enriched to about 3 percent. Recently
Iran claimed that its experiments brought enrichment to over 4 percent. Nuclear weapons require enrichment of 90
percent, although a lesser figure would suffice for a less-efficient bomb.
But doesn't Iran have the right to enrich uranium?
Yes, it does. Under the NPT, Iran has the right to peaceful technologies. And enrichment technology can generate fuel
for power reactors. The problem is that Iran does not operate a power reactor. Although its Russian-built plant may go
online next year, Iran's proposed enrichment program would only make economic sense if it fueled a dozen reactors. Still,
Iran claims it needs the program for energy independence.
But Iran sits on a sea of oil.
True, but the government wants to extend the life of its oil and natural gas fields. The development of fuel substitutes,
including nuclear energy, allows this.
So let's return to Iran's enrichment plant. You imply that Iran had a secret enrichment program.
That's right. In 2002, a London-based Iranian dissident group released information that Iran was building a large
enrichment plant under the noses of international inspectors. The crap hit the fan. The IAEA [International Atomic Energy
Agency] demanded that Iran come clean. Iran was very defensive at first. It called the demands of the Agency to reveal
all selective and discriminatory. It stammered that the IAEA relied on false dissident claims and U.S. arm-twisting.
Was the U.S. twisting arms?
Well, you might say Washington raised quite a fuss. After all, it was pretty clear that Tehran was violating its vows to
provide the IAEA full nuclear transparency. Called on the carpet, the mullahs announced their full commitment to the
NPT. However, in June 2003, drawing on international inspections and new documentation, the IAEA revealed its initial
findings: Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement with respect to reporting of nuclear
material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was
stored. In a nutshell, Tehran was cheating.
What happened next?
The U.S. pressed for U.N. Security Council consideration. You see, the IAEA has no enforcement capacity. All it can do is
report violations to the council. However, the agency's board was unwilling to take the step. The Europeans, concerned
that matters could get of control, pleaded with Washington to give diplomacy a chance. The Bush administration, burned
by Iraq, reluctantly agreed.
So Iraq had an impact on how we've handled Iran?
No doubt. Washington would have been far more aggressive in confronting the mullahs had it not been tied down across
the Persian Gulf.
What happened to the European initiative?
In October 2003, the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and Britain flew to Tehran and said, "Let's work out a deal."
The EU3, as they are called, then met with Iranian delegates off and on for a period of years. At times - to promote
"progress" - the Iranians would halt their enrichment activities. But the negotiations stalled - the Iranians brushed aside
European diplomatic and economic carrots. They refused to give up their enrichment program as the Europeans
demanded. In the meantime, the IAEA issued periodic reports calling Iran on the carpet for failing to reveal all to
inspectors.
So diplomacy went nowhere?
That's true. Iran used the time to bolster its enrichment experiments declaring that its objectives remained peaceful. The
Bush administration declared repeatedly that it had had enough and demanded that the matter be forwarded to the
Security Council. Finally, the IAEA did so. But here's the rub: Both China and Russia are reluctant to press Tehran too
hard. China has large gas and oil interests in Iran, and Russia seeks nuclear power plant contracts. Neither wants to
apply sanctions. Both countries are "free riders," meaning they are willing to have the U.S. take the heat. If things work
out, they benefit; if they don't, they still benefit.
Where does that leave us today?
The Europeans are back at it. They have asked for another chance to buy Iran off. Washington has signed on and
offered another carrot: it has agreed to sit down with Tehran as long as it suspends its enrichment program. Iran insists
that it will not surrender its right to enrich uranium, but it has not commented on suspension. Washington remains wary
and has not excluded the military option if Tehran refuses to bend. Indeed, the Bush administration may be laying the
groundwork. The Los Angeles Times reported on May 20 that the United States has offered Iran's neighbors air and
missile defenses. The Times suggests that these systems will defend against Iranian coercion in the event Tehran
becomes a nuclear weapons state. But the defenses also can shield these countries against retaliation in the event the
U.S. conducts a military strike.
This sounds ominous. How are we going to resolve this problem?
If we stay on the current "chicken" track things can get very ugly. Unfortunately the Bush administration has not thought
out of the box.
How would probation work?
The seeds for resolution can come from Iran's persistent declaration that its nuclear objectives remain peaceful. "Nuclear
probation," trip-wired to an enforcement mousetrap, offers an unexplored option to put the peaceful proclamation to a
final test. Given its history of safeguards violations, Tehran would agree to place resident international inspectors at all
atomic sites of concern indefinitely. They've already said they would do this. In an April 6 New York Times op-ed, Iran's
ambassador floated a trial balloon which included this element. Washington should pocket this concession and others,
including affirmations to open up suspicious facilities to snap inspections, ban nuclear weapons material and weapons,
prevent unauthorized access to nuclear material, apply export controls, refrain from plutonium production, and convert all
enriched uranium to fuel rods enriched to no greater than 3 percent power reactor grade, while accepting additional
foreign commercial oversight.
In addition, under probation, Iran would expand IAEA access to personnel and procurement documentation, dual-use
equipment and military workshops, and research and development locations that the Agency demands.
Now, here is the clincher: To avoid the dithering that now characterizes the Security Council's enforcement, under my
probation plan, Iran would tether itself to a tripwire that would automatically set in motion the nonproliferation mousetrap
endorsed in advance by the Council were the mullahs to initiate a proliferation breakout. The compliance mousetrap
would lay out an expeditious timetable for the imposition of increasingly dramatic punitive measures, including economic
sanctions, travel restrictions, military blockade, and armed action to destroy suspicious nuclear facilities inventoried by
the resident inspectors and other intelligence. Successful application will discourage other countries from violating their
nonproliferation vows.
Basically, probation pulls the Iranians in by taking their word about their peaceful nuclear intentions and eases the
Security Council into adopting a more proactive stance in case Tehran fails to live up to this agreement. It's a win-win for
all sides. Furthermore, the time is ripe. Given the recent U.S. initiative, in the weeks and months to come we are going to
see a lot of diplomatic back-and-forth. Probation provides the mechanism to resolve the dispute permanently.
Dr. Bennett Ramberg: Both Washington and Tehran appear to be playing "chicken." Much like two cars careening
toward each other, both are reluctant to step off the accelerator and avoid a disastrous collision. Washington's current
incentive package may do little to change the momentum, given Iran's repeated commitment to continue its enrichment
program.
Could that result in a global crisis?
You bet it could. Iran sits at the pivot of the world's oil resources. Were conflict to break out - were the United States to
conduct a military strike as Israel did in 1981 against Iraq to eliminate Tehran's suspect nuclear weapons capacity - the
world economy would be impacted dramatically. If you think $70 per barrel is a lot of money, think again; $100-$150 is
the trajectory of petroleum pricing that we could see as a base plateau. Then there is the possibility of Iranian retaliation
against U.S. interests in Iraq and elsewhere. That's why we have to figure out a diplomatic formula that would both test
Iran's intentions and mobilize the international community to oppose its nuclear weapons development. I think I have
found one in "nuclear probation."
Probation?
Yes. It is a unique means to resolve the conflict. It would grant Iran's right to mature its nuclear fuel-cycle facilities,
subject to the presence of residential inspectors and a "nuclear mousetrap" - an automatic international enforcement
mechanism endorsed by the Security Council that would spring into action were Iran to break a nonproliferation tripwire.
It's an idea based on accepting Iran's position that it only wants to develop nuclear capability for peaceful purposes, but if
it bolts from its nonproliferation vows the hammer would drop with predetermined sanctions culminating in military
consequences without any of the dilly-dallying we see now at the U.N.
That seems like a tall order. Is there a historical context that bears out the possibility that this could actually work?
This would be a novel approach that would reinforce international mechanisms to enforce nonproliferation generally. A
review of history suggests why it is needed. Iran's interest in nuclear weapons actually goes back to the era of the Shah.
In the 1970s, the United States provided Tehran with nuclear assistance as part of our Atoms for Peace program. We
believed that exports tethered to oversight would prevent countries from getting the bomb.
So there were safeguards?
Oh, yes. In 1970, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] went into force, requiring all signatories to reveal their
nuclear activities, except the five acknowledged nuclear weapons states - the U.S., the USSR, Britain, France, and China.
However, the Shah hoped to use the peaceful program to shroud a parallel nuclear weapons effort. The ambition went
up in smoke with the 1979 Iranian revolution that kicked him out of the country.
So the Shah falls and then what happened?
Well, the revolutionary regime revived the possibility through an enrichment program.
The enriched uranium could give them the bomb, right?
Well, it depends on the level of enrichment. Power reactors require uranium-35 enriched to about 3 percent. Recently
Iran claimed that its experiments brought enrichment to over 4 percent. Nuclear weapons require enrichment of 90
percent, although a lesser figure would suffice for a less-efficient bomb.
But doesn't Iran have the right to enrich uranium?
Yes, it does. Under the NPT, Iran has the right to peaceful technologies. And enrichment technology can generate fuel
for power reactors. The problem is that Iran does not operate a power reactor. Although its Russian-built plant may go
online next year, Iran's proposed enrichment program would only make economic sense if it fueled a dozen reactors. Still,
Iran claims it needs the program for energy independence.
But Iran sits on a sea of oil.
True, but the government wants to extend the life of its oil and natural gas fields. The development of fuel substitutes,
including nuclear energy, allows this.
So let's return to Iran's enrichment plant. You imply that Iran had a secret enrichment program.
That's right. In 2002, a London-based Iranian dissident group released information that Iran was building a large
enrichment plant under the noses of international inspectors. The crap hit the fan. The IAEA [International Atomic Energy
Agency] demanded that Iran come clean. Iran was very defensive at first. It called the demands of the Agency to reveal
all selective and discriminatory. It stammered that the IAEA relied on false dissident claims and U.S. arm-twisting.
Was the U.S. twisting arms?
Well, you might say Washington raised quite a fuss. After all, it was pretty clear that Tehran was violating its vows to
provide the IAEA full nuclear transparency. Called on the carpet, the mullahs announced their full commitment to the
NPT. However, in June 2003, drawing on international inspections and new documentation, the IAEA revealed its initial
findings: Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement with respect to reporting of nuclear
material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was
stored. In a nutshell, Tehran was cheating.
What happened next?
The U.S. pressed for U.N. Security Council consideration. You see, the IAEA has no enforcement capacity. All it can do is
report violations to the council. However, the agency's board was unwilling to take the step. The Europeans, concerned
that matters could get of control, pleaded with Washington to give diplomacy a chance. The Bush administration, burned
by Iraq, reluctantly agreed.
So Iraq had an impact on how we've handled Iran?
No doubt. Washington would have been far more aggressive in confronting the mullahs had it not been tied down across
the Persian Gulf.
What happened to the European initiative?
In October 2003, the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and Britain flew to Tehran and said, "Let's work out a deal."
The EU3, as they are called, then met with Iranian delegates off and on for a period of years. At times - to promote
"progress" - the Iranians would halt their enrichment activities. But the negotiations stalled - the Iranians brushed aside
European diplomatic and economic carrots. They refused to give up their enrichment program as the Europeans
demanded. In the meantime, the IAEA issued periodic reports calling Iran on the carpet for failing to reveal all to
inspectors.
So diplomacy went nowhere?
That's true. Iran used the time to bolster its enrichment experiments declaring that its objectives remained peaceful. The
Bush administration declared repeatedly that it had had enough and demanded that the matter be forwarded to the
Security Council. Finally, the IAEA did so. But here's the rub: Both China and Russia are reluctant to press Tehran too
hard. China has large gas and oil interests in Iran, and Russia seeks nuclear power plant contracts. Neither wants to
apply sanctions. Both countries are "free riders," meaning they are willing to have the U.S. take the heat. If things work
out, they benefit; if they don't, they still benefit.
Where does that leave us today?
The Europeans are back at it. They have asked for another chance to buy Iran off. Washington has signed on and
offered another carrot: it has agreed to sit down with Tehran as long as it suspends its enrichment program. Iran insists
that it will not surrender its right to enrich uranium, but it has not commented on suspension. Washington remains wary
and has not excluded the military option if Tehran refuses to bend. Indeed, the Bush administration may be laying the
groundwork. The Los Angeles Times reported on May 20 that the United States has offered Iran's neighbors air and
missile defenses. The Times suggests that these systems will defend against Iranian coercion in the event Tehran
becomes a nuclear weapons state. But the defenses also can shield these countries against retaliation in the event the
U.S. conducts a military strike.
This sounds ominous. How are we going to resolve this problem?
If we stay on the current "chicken" track things can get very ugly. Unfortunately the Bush administration has not thought
out of the box.
How would probation work?
The seeds for resolution can come from Iran's persistent declaration that its nuclear objectives remain peaceful. "Nuclear
probation," trip-wired to an enforcement mousetrap, offers an unexplored option to put the peaceful proclamation to a
final test. Given its history of safeguards violations, Tehran would agree to place resident international inspectors at all
atomic sites of concern indefinitely. They've already said they would do this. In an April 6 New York Times op-ed, Iran's
ambassador floated a trial balloon which included this element. Washington should pocket this concession and others,
including affirmations to open up suspicious facilities to snap inspections, ban nuclear weapons material and weapons,
prevent unauthorized access to nuclear material, apply export controls, refrain from plutonium production, and convert all
enriched uranium to fuel rods enriched to no greater than 3 percent power reactor grade, while accepting additional
foreign commercial oversight.
In addition, under probation, Iran would expand IAEA access to personnel and procurement documentation, dual-use
equipment and military workshops, and research and development locations that the Agency demands.
Now, here is the clincher: To avoid the dithering that now characterizes the Security Council's enforcement, under my
probation plan, Iran would tether itself to a tripwire that would automatically set in motion the nonproliferation mousetrap
endorsed in advance by the Council were the mullahs to initiate a proliferation breakout. The compliance mousetrap
would lay out an expeditious timetable for the imposition of increasingly dramatic punitive measures, including economic
sanctions, travel restrictions, military blockade, and armed action to destroy suspicious nuclear facilities inventoried by
the resident inspectors and other intelligence. Successful application will discourage other countries from violating their
nonproliferation vows.
Basically, probation pulls the Iranians in by taking their word about their peaceful nuclear intentions and eases the
Security Council into adopting a more proactive stance in case Tehran fails to live up to this agreement. It's a win-win for
all sides. Furthermore, the time is ripe. Given the recent U.S. initiative, in the weeks and months to come we are going to
see a lot of diplomatic back-and-forth. Probation provides the mechanism to resolve the dispute permanently.
 | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  |
| Dr. Bennett Ramberg - 3rd Degree Interview |
| This interview appeared in LA CityBeat June 15, 2006 |
The international dispute over Iran's fledgling nuclear program has
reached an impasse, and, shockingly, the Bush administration's
response has been more carrot than stick. Just a week ago, the U.S.
offered Iran a package of economic and diplomatic incentives in the
hopes that this would resolve the current flap. Tehran's response
continues to be defiance: It will not halt its nuclear enrichment
activities. While the diplomatic dance must still play out, however,
Washington has few remaining peaceful options. As the risk of a global
showdown grows, CityBeat sat down with one of the country's
preeminent experts on nuclear proliferation and terrorism, Dr. Bennett
Ramberg, to get an insider's assessment of where we go from here. A
Ph.D. in International Relations from the prestigious Johns Hopkins
University's School for Advanced International Studies, Ramberg is the
author of a plethora of books and articles on nuclear issues. Most
well-known for his classic treatment of the vulnerability of nuclear
power plants to military attack and sabotage - Nuclear Power Plants as
Weapons for the Enemy (University of California Press) - Ramberg has
been on the faculty at Stanford, Princeton, and UCLA, consulted
Congress on foreign policy, and worked in the State Department
during the administration of George H.W. Bush. Over the last several
years, Dr. Ramberg has become the country's most published
newspaper commentator on nuclear security issues, having authored
over 30 Op-Eds in major papers in his attempt to turn the world away
from another nuclear arms race.
-Michael Collins
reached an impasse, and, shockingly, the Bush administration's
response has been more carrot than stick. Just a week ago, the U.S.
offered Iran a package of economic and diplomatic incentives in the
hopes that this would resolve the current flap. Tehran's response
continues to be defiance: It will not halt its nuclear enrichment
activities. While the diplomatic dance must still play out, however,
Washington has few remaining peaceful options. As the risk of a global
showdown grows, CityBeat sat down with one of the country's
preeminent experts on nuclear proliferation and terrorism, Dr. Bennett
Ramberg, to get an insider's assessment of where we go from here. A
Ph.D. in International Relations from the prestigious Johns Hopkins
University's School for Advanced International Studies, Ramberg is the
author of a plethora of books and articles on nuclear issues. Most
well-known for his classic treatment of the vulnerability of nuclear
power plants to military attack and sabotage - Nuclear Power Plants as
Weapons for the Enemy (University of California Press) - Ramberg has
been on the faculty at Stanford, Princeton, and UCLA, consulted
Congress on foreign policy, and worked in the State Department
during the administration of George H.W. Bush. Over the last several
years, Dr. Ramberg has become the country's most published
newspaper commentator on nuclear security issues, having authored
over 30 Op-Eds in major papers in his attempt to turn the world away
from another nuclear arms race.
-Michael Collins
